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The Missions of the Indian Navy 
by 
Gary L. Sojka 
Introduction 
Since the advent of the first oil crisis, the United States and its alHes have
recognized the strategic importance of the Pcnian Gulf-Indian Ocean area, 
The second oil crisis. followed by the seizure of American diplomats in Iran, and then 
by the Jranian-lraql War, reinforced the importance of this area in Western minds. 
Along with i11creased Western interest, American and allied defense analysts began 
to focus their attention on military development� within the important oil-producing 
countries of Iran. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Placed equal1y high on their 
agenda were the activities of such Soviet client states as South Yemen and Ethiopia. 
This focus remains today and is in many ways justified, Nevertheless, it all too often 
overlooks the premier littoral state in the area-India. This is unfortunate, for India 
not only has the most capable armed forces, including navy. of all the littoral states, it 
a1so has strong ties with the Soviet Union, having signed in 1971 a Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship. and Cooperatlon, 1 
In order to understand the role the Indian Navy plays in the Indian Ocean, it is 
necessary to look at India's national mission, its maritime interests, and the mls�ions 
and capabilities of its navy. For [ndia 's mis ... ion as a nation defines its maritime 
interests and, in a similar manner, India's maritime interests help to define the 
missions. and c.:apabilides of its navy, But it is not simply India's national goals with 
regard to its maritime interests which have an impact on its na.vy. Another factor is 
India's industrial base. Also important are perceived threats to maritime interests; 
and, indee<l, naval training, force deployment and capabilities, and even the 
orientation of naval mlssions retlect both rhe nation's and the navy's visions of future 
conl1ict. 
National Mission 
India 1s phy.,.kally a large country, encompassing about 1.26 million square miles, 
with a coastline of roughly .1,500 miles.2 Within its borders live .�omc 700 mHlion 
people, characterized by their substantial and well-known diversity. This diversity 
manifests itself in the economic, religious, soda!, and lingui,tk realms. For example, 
most Indians engage in subsistence agriculture, but there is an ever-growing 
manufacturing and trading sector. Hinduism, practiced by nearly 80 percent ofd,c 
populatlot1, is the predominant religion; but a sizable Muslim population (11 percent) 
exists, and there are pockets of Christians, Jews, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and 
Zornastriaus. The Hindu caste system stratifies a large portion of the country along 
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
5War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
6Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
7War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
8Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
9War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
11
War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
13
War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
15
War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 36 [1983], No. 1, Art. 21
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss1/21
17
War College: January-February 1983 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1983
16 
Warfare in the Fourth Dimension­
ls the Navy Ready for it? 
How can the Navy Prepare for it? 
by 
Lieutenant Commander G. Guy Thomas, US Navy 
Most dictionaries define the fourth dimcnsmn as time, however, some military
writings refer to a fourth dimension of military endeavor beyond the three 
traditional ones of sea, air and land. That dimension is the electromagnetic spectrum. 
The two concepts rnay, at first glance appear to have little in common with each 
other bm, in fact, they are closely related. The battle for the electromagnetic 
spectrum is, in many respects, a battle for time. 
RAdm. Albert A, Gallotta, a recent Director, Electronic Warfare and Cryptol­
ogy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, made the point very clear indeed when 
he said, "I view all battles as having a time line that can be divided into four phases: 1) 
the force coordination phase. 2) the surveillance phase. 3} the targeting, weapons 
direction phase i and 4) the weapon•s fusing and impact phase, i.e., the actual 
engagement. Electronic warfare is paramount in the first three phases." He went on 
to say that we need to get our operatfona! co_mmanders to spend more time thinking 
about the first three phases of the battle, rather than spending all of their time 
thinking about only the last two (targeting and engagement).' 
The purpose of this paper is to define a need within the Navy for additional 
thinking about 14 warfare in the fourth dimension" and to suggest how electronic 
warfare could be simulated for education and training purposes at the Naval War 
College to add to the readiness of our Navy. Fleet readiness is the primary mission of 
the Naval War College and its Center for War Gaming and it must be remembered 
readiness is a primary requirement for any strategy involving the Navy, no matter 
what its objective. 
The Naval War College is acquiring a new computer-driven war gaming system, 
the Naval War Gaming System, to assist in maintaining that readiness. The Naval 
War Gaming System will have the capability to simulate EW alld c3 (command, 
control and communications) sys.terns: but, as delivered, that capability needs further 
refinement in order to accurately play EW and c3 systems. Currently the Naval
War College inputs EW into its war games by modifying rhe probability of kill (pk) 
in its barrle damage assessment calculations, This method, while better than nothing, 
is insufficient to accurarely measure the effectiveness of EW. A major portion of the 
effectivene$sof EW is the time delays that it generates. This is true of both offensive 
and defensive EW systems. War gaming Battle Damage Assessment is only a 
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Israel's New Military Doctrine 
by 
Efraim Inbar 
T his paper examines the changes in Israel's strategic thinking since 1980. We can distinguish two stages in the development of the Israeli strategic 
thinking since the 1973 war: the first in the 70s and the second starting in 1980. In the 
first period, Israel perceived its political isolation and great dependence upon the 
United States, which reduced its freedom of action. Furthermore, Israel needed time 
to rebuild its army and its confidence. Israel lost some of its deterring power, but it 
felt that its borders still provided the country a margin of security which could be 
enhanced by incorporating some military and political arrangements. Demilitari­
zation and tripwire arrangements were sought after. 
In the first stage, the Israeli military thinking resembled the doctrine of the period 
before the war. Israel continued to hold a defensive strategy, i.e., the ability to 
absorb an Arab first attack to be followed by an Israeli decisive counter attack. In 
order to continue the posture adopted in the 1967-73 period several improvements 
were required. This meant a larger army, better equipped with defensive weapons 
and deployed in improved fortified lines. There was a greater emphasis on quantities 
and firepower, and ways were devised to improve the Israeli Defense Force's ability 
to be well prepared for absorbing an Arab military onslaught. 
In the second period, we can discern a shift from the quantitative aspect of Israel's 
arms competition with her Arab opponents in favor of the qualitative aspect. In 
addition, a system of casi be/Ii was reintroduced and a greater predilection for 
preemptive strikes was adopted. 
The two periods are indeed distinguishable not only by the content of their 
military thinking but also by differing leaders, ideologies, and temperaments. Israel 
was ruled during most of the first period by Rabin's Labor-dominated Government 
Qune 1974-June 1977), while for most of this period the Chief of Staff was the 
Labor-picked Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur (April 1974-April 1978). 
In 1977, Labor was succeeded by Begin's Likud-dominated Government. In 1978, 
Gur was replaced by Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan, who is ideologically closer to the Likud. 
The main changes in Israeli strategic thinking in the second period are connected 
however to Ariel Sharon's ascendance in security affairs. After Moshe Dayan 
resigned from his post as Foreign Minister in October 1979 and Ezer Weizman, the 
Defense Minister, did the same in May 1980, Sharon became the dominant figure in 
Israel's defense policy. Indeed, after the 1981 election, he was elevated from the 
Ministry of Agriculture to the Defense Ministry. 
In spite of the ultimate military successes in the 1973 war, the initial setbacks, the 
heavy losses in material and in casualties, the deficiencies revealed in various 
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What the Coast Guard Needs: 
Cutters That Count 
by 
Lieutenant Commander C.H. Hill, US Coast Guard 
T he Navy must be able to conduct sustained combat operations on a worldwide scale. It has been given the money to build ships for that purpose, 
bur it is unlikely that there will be enough people to man all the ships needed. 
While the Navy can get ships hut not enough people, the Coast Guard can get 
people, but not enough ships. At least, with its static or shrinking budget the Coast 
Guard cannot replace its obsolete ships and meet its increasing responsibilities in a 
timely fashion. Of such asymmetric problems opportunities can be made. 
The Navy must both provide forces for contingencies across a wide spccrrum of 
intensity and prepare itself to fight in an extended conflict. 
What separates these cases is that in contingencies only active forces arc used. In 
an extended conflict additional forces, including the Naval Reserve and Coast 
Guard, are mobilized. 
Recently, the Navy has enjoyed relatively generous funding for construction, and 
plans call for more of the same. While naval recruiting and personnel retention have 
been good in the last year or two, when the economy improves it is probable that 
both will run into trouble. But the good years economically are the times when most 
money will be available to build new ships. And paying the operating and 
maintenance cost of an expanded and more sophisticated fleet while continuing 
modernization will require continued sustained growth of the budget. If a less 
sympathetic administration is elected the Navy will again have to choose between 
operations and modernization. 
There is also a conflict between readiness for contingencies and readiness for 
general war in the way ships are manned and deployed. These differences are 
pointedly illustrated by the frigate. Frigates arc built for convoy escort, not for battle 
group operations. But, because too few destroyers are built, frigates often are 
operated in their place, in an environment for which they were never intended. One 
method of providing the additional forces required for a protracted conflict at less 
cost is to depend on the Naval Reserve. Typically a Reserve Force combatant is 
manued to only a 50 percent level by regular Navy personnel, Thus, for a price in 
peacetime readiness, with the same number of regulars twice the number of frigates 
can be manned for potential wartime use. 
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Rules of Engagement 
by 
Captain J. Ashley Roach, JAGC, US Navy 
There is a very real need for greater knowledge ofRnles of Engagement on 
.1.. the part of strategy and policy personnel, tacticians and operators. and even 
by our civilian leaders. At present these rnles are rarely, if ever, exercised and toofew planners and commanders seek contingent approval for additional or relaxed 
rules. Particularly telling is the fact that the requirement for an annual compiling and sending to JCS of the effective Rules of Engagement is all but ignored-and few
appear to care! Why? 
Definitions 
Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives that a government may establish to 
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and 
air forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces, 1 
Under this JCS definition, ROE should not delineate specific tactics, should riol 
cover restrictions on specific system operations, should not cover safety-related 
restrictions, should not ser forrh service doctrine, tactics or procedures. Frequently 
these matters are covered in documents called ROE.2 ROE should never be "rudder 
orders," and cettainly should never substitute for a strategy governing the use o( 
deployed forces, in a peacetime eris.is or in wartime. 
figure 1 is a Venn diagram showing two concentric circles, one wholly inside the 
other. The area o( the larger circle encompasses all those actions permitted under the 
law (domestlc law and the law of armed conflict). The area of the inner cirde 
represents those fewer actions permitted by the ROE. 
The 1aw o( armed conflict binds the actions of nations and their armed forces. The 
United States government can, by its own action, change its ROE; international law, 
however, can be changed only by interna�ional agreement or consistent practice of 
nations. The law of armed conflict and domestic law are, o( course. important 
influences in drafting the ROE, but they are not the only influences, ROB also reflect 
the influence of operational, political, and diplomatic factors. 
fjgure 21 another Venn diagram, illustrates that ROE result from a composite of 
these fbur factors. We have four circles centered on different points. They generally 
will be of differing diameters, since the relative influence of these four factors will 
vary depending on the circumstances. The common intersection of these four circles 
represents ROE. ROE then shape the force that may be used in order to achieve the 
political purpose and thus form the plane upon which Clauscwitz 1s observation ( that 
war is the extension of politics by other means) ls brought into focus. 48
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Airships for the 1990s? 
by 
Lieutenant Commander John E. Jackson, Supply 
Corps, US Navy 
In the minds of most people, the usefulncs£ of 
lighter-than-air (LTA) craft cmlcd on a rainy May evening in 1937 when the German Zeppelin Hindenburi 
(LZ-129) dramatically burn into flames and embed before a horrified crowd at the 
Naval Air Station in Lakehursl, New Jersey. This w.as captured 011 film and audio­
tape by the small army of newsmen who untlinchlngly recorded the death throes of 
the 800-foot long airship. (n the weeks following the crash, milllons of movie viewers 
around the world were electrified by the sight of the flaming Zeppelin slowly 
settling to rest amid the screams of passengers, crew members, and on-lookers, Most 
of us have since seen it at least once on television, 
In terms of modern air crashes, the death toll was modest, a mere 36 1 hut in 1937 
this was the largest number of people yet to die in a crash involving a single aircrafL 
The actual cause of the disaster has never been identified, and even today the debate 
continues between thos.e historians who believe the Hindenburx fell victim to anti­
Nazi sabotage and those who believe narural causes (such as static electriclty or 
lightning) ignited the airship's six-million cubic feet of hydrogen. 
While the canse of the crash is still debatahle, the results were immediately 
evident. The Deutsche Luft:schiff Reederei, the German company which operated 
the giant airships, promptly grounded the Hindenburg's highly successful older 
"'sistc-r,H the Graf Zeppelin (LZ-127) which was returning from a flight to South 
Amerka at the time of the Lakehurst crash, The Grdf carried rite last commercial 
passenger ever to fly in a rigid airship, and ended a Jong and successful career which 
had seen the airship .across the South Atlantic 140 times, the North Atlantic seven 
times, and the Pacific once, By the time she was retired in 1937 she had flown for over 
16,000 hours, covering over a million miles while carryinf; 13,100 passengers. 
Despite this impressive record, the Nazi regime feared that another crash could 
tarnish the .. invincible" image of the Third Reich, and the Graf Zeppi4in was 
permanently taken out of service and put on public display in a hangar. With the 
demise of Germany's passenger-airship business, the Luftwaffe assumed control of 
the last remaining operational rigid airship in the world, rhe Graf Zt'ppelin If (LZ-
130), which was identical In size to the Hindenbur�. Jn 1938 and 1939, LZ-130 was used 
to conduct some of the world's first airborne clectronJC intelligence missions, 
The Germans had become aw.are o( the construction of a number of tall towers 
along the British coastline facing the European continent. Anxious to determine the 
military potential of these site�. the Luftwaffe outfitted the LZ-130 as a flying 
clectronks laboratory. The airship made a number of flights a1ong the British 
co,1s.tline rn intercept and analyze the emission from the mysterious towers, But the 
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The Trident System: 
Submarines, Missiles, 
and Strategic Doctrine 
by 
Commander James John Tritten, US Navy 
61 
O n 11 November 1981, the USS Ohio (SSBN-726) was commi,­
sioned, The first of the new Trident submarines, Ohio is the product of years 
of research, development, controversy, and hard work. Yet Oido is but one part of a 
total Trident System which includes ships and missiles, logistic support plans, 
training, and basing modes. 
This treatise will analyze the two major aspects of the US Trident System: 
Ohio-class submarines and Trident missiles. The major issues in their development 
wilJ be considered as will alternatives to each. Finally, prospects for the furure will 
be examined based on the new realities of strategic nuclear force employment in a 
potential contlict. The impact of the Trident System on both the US Navy and this 
nation's strategic nuclear capabilities is potentially so profound that it could 
fundamentally restructure the long-held triad of land-based missiles, manned 
bombers. and the submarine ballistic missHe force. 
The Ohio-Class Submarine
The Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is the largest 
submersible ever constructed by the United Stares. Ohio is 560 ft. long. 42 ft. wide, 
and displaces 18,700 tons submerged, ft can accommodate 164 personnel but will 
normally be manned by two alternating (Blue/Gold) crews of 15 officers and 142 
enlisted men. Each Ohio will have 24 missile tubes and 4 torpedo tubes. The 
submarine was built by EJectric Boat, a subsidiary ofC':reneral Dynamics, in Groton, 
Conm:cticut. 
The building of a new SSllN stems from the extensive STRAT-X study 
commissioned by Secretary ofDefens:e Robert McNamara in 1966. 1 STRAT-X was 
to determine if the United States needed a new advanced intercontinental ballistic 
missile (JCBM) and if so, how it was to be based, Nine possible systems were 
analyzed including land, surface ship, and submarine-based alternatives. Over 100 
various combinations of submarine-launched ballistic miss:Hes (SLBMs) on differing 
submarines were considered, 
STRAT-X recommended in 1967 four pos�ible options. Prom these, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) favored a plan for an Underwater Long-Ranged 
Missile System(ULMS). ULMS was a logical choice since the Navy's Polaris/Poseidon 
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PROFESSION AL READING 
They "sensed that they had an unwritten contract with the Navy 
and their officers." 
by 
Hugh Nott• 
Mason, Theodore. Battleship Sailor. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 271pp. 
$14.95 
More than forty years ago, on 7 December 1941, high above the explosionsand flames convulsing Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor, 19-ycar-old 
Radioman Third Class Ted Mason had a ring,,.idt' seat for the stunning event that 
would commit himself a11d his entire generation of Americans to four years of savage 
war. From his battle station in the maintop of the USS California, helplessly exposed 
to the strafing runs of a ttackingjapanese aircraft, the young sailor watched the tragic 
debacle he had not known would, or could, happen, Tl1e boyish Mason was luckier 
than many of his California shipmates who were sealed in the main radio spaces below 
armored hatches, deliberately designed to be inoperable from bdow when Condition 
Zed was set. Several of his closest frien<ls and his admired chief radioman supervisor, 
awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor, did not survive. 
This vividly recalled account. four decades later, mixes recrimination with 
anguish and serves to remind us that the young Navy enlisted men who lived and died 
that momentous Sun<lay morning may have felt as much outrage against their 
leaders, who had not planned, as against the Japanese, who had. In a somewhat vague 
but personal and co11ective way, Mason an<l his battleship colleagues had sensed that 
they had an unwritten contract with rhe Navy and their officers, In exchange for 
their obedlence, loyalty, and second-class shipboard citizenship, subject to stern 
regulations and sometimes harsh discipline, they believed their more privileged 
Captain Nott died on 2January. This review is the last of the many contributions 
he made to the Naval War College. 
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Winslow, W.G. 'rlu·Flt·ettheCods l·'orgM: 
Tire U.S. ilsiarit l-'lerr in fl'orid U'ar !I,
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 
327pp. $21.9.\ 
Captain Winslow's hook documents 
the demi.�e of the Asiatic Fleet at the 
onset of World War IL It is a hiscory of 
inglorious tactical failures and planning 
shnrtfalls dramatically contrasted with 
accounts of personal courage, determi­
nation, and heroic achievements by men 
fighting against overwhelming odds. 
'/'Ju, Flee/ thf' Gods hngot, ttnlikc mo�t 
World War II histories, is. not a single 
story chronologically following the 
progress of a battle plan towards its 
ohjcctive, [r is il collection of accounts 
about various units of thls ilt-fatcd fleet 
which, though undeniably interrelated, 
arc each disrinctly different, l)Ot scpar;ttc 
facet� nf a more c.:omplcx battle plan, 
Thi-. h because the Asiatic Fleet could 
not afford to exercise t;u:tical options 
after the commencement ofhnstilities. Ir 
w ;ts n·dnced to reacting to Japanese 
initiatives and trying to execute a less 
than organized withdrawal to safer 
waters. Consequently, there was nn 
overall battle plan for this story to 
follow. 
Part r, Operations, provi<les a thumb­
nail sketch of the fleet, the tactical 
environment, the numerou� cnmmandcn 
and pretenders to command, the allied 
forces in the theater, and a brief desnip­
tion of the performance of each compo­
nent by ship type and air units. Part n. 
Battle Reports. is a collection of sixteen 
separate stories which detail heroism and 
adventure unparalleled by fiction. 
The most salient quality of this hook is 
its relevance to today's situation in tl,e 
Western Pacific. The tmmber of parallels 
is so remarkable it i.\ alannin�. The 
overage and ovcrcommltted Asiatic 
Fleet operated in waters now patrolled 
by the Seventh Fleet. While the average 
Professional Reading 83 
,1gc of Seventh Fleet ships today is 
considerably less than rhat nf Admir�il 
Hart's ships in 1941, today's technology 
brings on ohrnlcs<:cnn more rnpidly. 
The expansion of Scvcntli fleet opcra­
tintls tn inclmlc a continuing presence in 
the Indian Occ:•n since late t979 has left 
current assets strctd1ed to near the limit 
of material and logistic endurance. 
Recognizing the ,Hlditional commit­
ments wluch would hcfoll the Asiatic 
Fleet if the world situation continued m 
deteriorate Admiral Richardson, Com­
mander-in-Chief, US l;lcct in 1940, 
scheduled a suhstantlal reinforcement 
includitig ;1n aircraft carrier, three 
cruisers, and mtmernus lc.�ser vessels. Ay 
May of 1941, however, the reinforce­
ment was reduced to the addition of 
twenty-thrt:c flet:t .mhmarint·s. Today 
the nC'ed to reconstitute our naval 
scrcn;zth is well rccop;uizcd, The ship­
lmil.Jing program hcing championed by 
Secn:t.uy Lehman will go a long way to 
c,1se the burden of the Sc:venth Fleet-lj' 
this ambitious pro�ram can he com­
pleted. 
The problems of rhc Asiatic Fleet 
went far hcyon<l having too few :.hips 
and their struggle to matmain an acct·pt­
ahlc material conditiot1. The ..:ommand 
and control organization was inadequate 
for the rigon of war. The surface 
combatants were ut1dcr a task force 
comm;mder who was unable to am;tss ;J 
force in one place adequate to confront 
tlie enemy, the suhmarincs were directed 
from the fleet commander\ head­
quarters, and the patrol squadrons were 
separately controlled by their own unit 
commander. To make matters worse, if 
they were to understand what other 
friendly units were doing these subordi­
nate commanden had m illegally copy 
and decode each other's message traffic. 
After the opcuing of hostilities, reorga­
nization of the tlcct and attempts ar 
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